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 In the current context of instability and financial crisis, understanding 
firm risk is crucial. In this study we aim to assess firm risk differences 
between family and non-family firms. Furthermore we analyze the 
family control impact, measured by both the family ownership and the 
F-PEC scale, in firm risk. We provide new evidence from family firm 
studies since we not only analyze the risk topic, almost unexplored, 
but we also introduce the F-PEC scale, an alternative way to measure 
the family influence. Using Portuguese quoted firms during the 1999-
2012 period, we find that family influence and control do not impact 
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In the actual context of uncertainty, instability 
and financial crisis, understanding firm’s risk is a 
central theme not only for financial researchers but 
also for all individuals. The bankruptcy of the 
American bank Lehman Brothers, in 2008, 
questioned financial market confidence and caused 
bankruptcies, unemployment and excessive debt all 
over the world. The solvability of different banks 
was also questioned. More recently, the insecurity of 
the Greek financial system as well as the Portuguese 
one, due to the excess deficit, has led to an increase 
in financial distrust. 
The firm total risk is the risk inherent in the 
firm’s activity. It can result from internal or external 
factors and it can have impact in the firm return. The 
firm risk is a combination of systematic and 
unsystematic risk. The first type of risk, also called 
market risk, is the uncertainty common to all the 
firms in a market. The other type of risk is a firm 
specific and unique risk that affects firms from the 
same industry or with similar characteristics (Ross et 
al., 2011). 
Increased risk has an impact on those directly and 
indirectly related with the firm. Therefore, it is 
important to comprehend which factors affect it 
(Wright et al., 1996). Several studies have been 
carried out so as to measure the impact of ownership 
structure on risk (Gadhoum and Ayadi, 2003, Díez 
et al., 2008, John et al., 2008). However, these 
studies are often focused on the bank sector, and 
headquartered in the U.S., and major European 
countries, neglecting other industries and regions.  
This study attempts to fill previous gaps in 
empirical literature with regard to corporate finance. 
We not only analyze the risk differences between 
family and non-family firms, as also analyze in more 
detail the family impact on it using two alternative 
measures of the family influence: family ownership 
and F-PEC scale, an alternative measure of family 
impact. We analyze all quoted firms (from all 
industries) of one small developed country: Portugal, 
which had some solvency problems. We attempt to 
explain why the majority of firms all over the world 
are family firms. 
The behavioral agency theory suggests that 
family presence in the firm may lead to risk 
reduction due to the long-term perspective and aim 
to pass on the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 
Bretton-Miller et al., 2011). The family may suffer 
from the risk concentration in a unique asset, the 
firm, and though they may be risk averse to business 
opportunities since it may put in place their personal 
wealth, reputation and recognition (Patel and 
Chrisman, 2013). Although, the impact may depends 
on the levels of family control and on the existence 
of growth opportunities. Following the agency 
theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), ownership 
concentration may lead to expropriations of the 
firm’s wealth. As to family firms the family socio-
emotional wealth is enhanced, the expropriation of 
the minority investors wealth may occur only when 
the firm as growth opportunities. 
Based on theoretical arguments and the 
behavioral agency theory, we developed the models 
to prove the validity of our hypotheses. Our results 
show that family influence and control do not impact 
the firm risk. Only the firm size, return and growth 
opportunities influence the firm risk.  
This result is of greater importance in the sense 
that, as previous studies found that family and non-
family firms present different return, it suggests that 
financial investors may have advantages to invest in 
family firms since the return may be higher and the 
firm risk taking is similar. Likewise our study is 
valuable to all individuals, financial investors or no, 
to deeply understand the firm risk and to know how 
to deal with it. 
The remainder of the article is organized as 
follows. Section 2 briefly reviews prior literature on 
this issue and outlines the hypotheses of this study. 
Section 3 describes the sample structure, dataset and 
methodology. Section 4 contains our empirical 
results and the discussion. Finally, section 5 
highlights the main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Family firm definition 
One of the major problems of family firm studies 
is the definition of a family business (Astrachan et 
al., 2002). There is no general accepted concept of 
family firms; each researcher uses his own one 
(Chami, 2001).  
There are three main ways to define a family 
business. Some researcher are more concerned with 
ownership, others focus on the family ownership and 
management involving, while others are worry with 
generational transfer (Astrachan et al., 2002). Klein 
(2000) states that a family can influence a business 
through ownership, corporate governance, and/or 
management. 
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To Anderson and Reeb (2003) a firm is classified 
as a family firm when the founding family has an 
equity stake in the firm and/or there are family 
members present on the board of directors. To 
Fahlenbrach (2009), a family firm is one where the 
CEO is the founder or co-founder of the firm. 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) argue that a firm is a 
family firm when it is owned and operated by the 
founding family. Miller et al. (2007) define a family 
firm as one in which multiple members of the same 
family are involved as major owners or managers.  
We focus our definition on “family controlled”. 
To our concern a family firm is a company that is 
owned and controlled by a family. This definition is 
similar to that of Anderson and Reeb (2003), and 
Miralles-Marcelo et al. (2013). In Portugal the 
tradition is relevant, so if a firm was created by a 
family or an individual with the major control, if that 
family remained a major investor when the firm 
went public, and if the family is present on the board 
of directors as CEO or holds another position which 
may control the CEO’s decisions, the family’s 
identity and culture is present in the firm.  
We did not establish a minimum threshold for 
family involvement in ownership as some 
researchers have done for several reasons. First, 
Martín-Reyna and Duran-Encalada (2012) argue that 
the cultural and legal contexts influence the family 
business. Second, for the majority of family firms in 
our sample, the families hold more than 10% of the 
company shares (the minimum threshold defined by 
some researchers such as Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003). 
Third, we assure that the family self-interests are 
accomplish since the family is present on the board 
of directors. Finally, for all the family firms in our 
sample we have carried out a double check to 
confirm our classification of family firms. We 
looked at the firm’s history to understand if family 
involvement in the process decision was guaranteed.  
Moreover, we do not use the F-PEC scale to 
classify the firm into family or non-family firm or 
into different clusters of family firms: weak, normal 
and strong as some researcher have done (Jaskiewicz 
et al., 2005). We have used it as an alternative 
solution to measure the family impact in the firm. 
This scale comprises three subscales: power, 
experience and culture, being more accurate to 
measure the family influence in the firm. 
 
2.2. Research focus and hypothesis 
Various studies find that family firms present at 
least similar financial performance than that of non-
family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Barontini 
and Caprio, 2006, Martin-Reyna and Duran-
Encalada, 2012, among others). Moreover, some 
researchers show that family firms outperform non-
family ones in regard to stock market performance 
(Corstjens et al., 2006, Fahlenbrach, 2009, Miralles-
Marcelo et al., 2013).  
These facts suggest risk differences between 
family and non-family firms, due to the binomial 
risk-return tradeoff. If family firms present higher 
return, their exposition to risk may be also different. 
Some researchers found that family firms present 
higher risk than their non-family counterparts due to 
the lack of family wealth diversification (Sullivan 
and Spong, 1988, Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 
2006).  
Although, for another side, family firms may 
present less risk that non-family firms. The family 
wealth and their personal risk directly depend on the 
firm. The family may suffer from the risk 
concentration in a unique asset, the firm (Erbetta et 
al., 2013). Indeed the family may tries to improve 
risk management and, in turn, reduce it. The 
behavioral theory argues that family owners pursue 
not only financial interests but also non-economic 
goals that create socio-emotional wealth (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). The family has affective needs, 
such as identity, reputation, the need for control and 
the perpetuation of the family dynasty, which can 
bring unique and value-added skills to the firm and 
impact on its risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). This 
suggests that the family only makes risky 
investments when it is important to sustain the firm 
in the future. The family is risk averse whenever 
their socioemotional wealth is threatened (Patel and 
Chrisman, 2013). 
As a result, the following hypothesis naturally 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Family firms present less risk than 
non-family firms. 
Despite the differences in risk between family 
and non-family firms, as family firms are not a 
homogeneous group, the firm risk may depend on 
the family control (Mazzi, 2011). 
When the family control is higher, the family 
may tries to reduce the firm risk. External capital is 
avoided since augment the firm financial risk and 
may jeopardize the family control (Patel and 
Chrisman, 2013). Moreover, new and innovative 
investments or activities and useful strategic 
initiatives which could improve the firm value may 
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be avoided if these may threaten the family wealth 
and reputation (Bretton-Miller et al., 2011). 
Taken together, these arguments suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher family control reduces the 
firm risk. 
Díez et al. (2008) prove that family impact in the 
firm risk is related with the firm’s growth 
opportunities. Increasing risk is not economically 
rational when the firm lacks growth opportunities as 
in this case the probability of the firm’s failure is 
higher (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003). When the firm 
has free cash flows and new and innovative projects 
to invest in, the family may try to satisfy its self-
interests, leading to risky decisions (Wright et al., 
1996). 
This lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with growth opportunities 
present higher risk than those with reduced ones. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Sample selection 
Our sample includes listed firms of Euronext 
Lisbon, during the period of 1999, the date of the 
introduction of the euro, until 2012. We study the 
Portuguese firms for several reasons. First, Portugal 
is a small-sized financial market with a growing 
importance in the world financial market. In regards 
to risks, Portugal is a country in vogue not only 
because some banks had some solvency problems 
(for example, Banco Português de Negócios) but 
also some policies of contraction were applied to 
reduce the economic deficit. 
Second, the most dominant companies in 
Portugal are family controlled. Around 70% of 
Portuguese firms and half of the Portuguese listed 
firms are family firms. Third, the majority of studies 
relating family issues and risk are focused on the 
bank sector, and headquartered in the U.S., and 
major European countries, neglecting other 
industries and regions. We analyze a small financial 
market and all industries, which is a form of 
interesting research intended for expanding 
international evidence, comparing it with existing 
results for major countries and extrapolating it to 
countries with similar characteristics. 
 
3.2. Data sources 
We use diverse databases to avoid 
misunderstandings and lack of information, and to 
build a cohesive sample. Our first concern was 
classifying firms into family ones. In this context, 
information on ownership was collected from 
Amadeus and Reuters databases. For each year in 
analysis, we analyze the names and ownership 
percentage of family owners. We also analyze the 
names of the members of the board of directors and 
the supervisory board. 
Then we manually classify firms into family and 
non-family. A firm is classified as a family firm 
whenever there is fractional equity ownership of the 
founding family and the presence of family members 
on the board of directors. All the others are non-
family firms.  1 presents the sample structure. 
Observing Table 1 we find that the number of 
non-family firms is higher than the number of family 
firms but the difference is not significant and the 
total number of observations is higher to family 
firms, suggesting that the presence of family firms in 
the market is older.  
To introduce the firm’s identity and analyze 
Table 1. Sample Structure 
 Number of Firms % Number of observations 
Family Firms 37 47,4% 383 
Non-Family Firms 41 52,6% 367 
This table presents the average number of firms and percentage and total number of observations (from 1999 to 2012) of family and nonfamily 
firms included in our sample. Family firms are firms owned and controlled by a family. 
 
Table 2. Family Control 
 %Fam Fam (F-PEC) 
Mean  36.52%  71.55% 
Std. Dev.  0.247  0.294 
This table presents the mean value and standard deviation (from 1999 to 2012) of family ownership measure by the 
percentage of ownership detained by the family (%Fam) and the F-PEC scale (Fam (F-PEC)). 
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whether it has an impact on the firm’s risk we use a 
dummy variable which is one when the firm is a 
family firm and zero otherwise (Dfam). The family 
ownership (%Fam) is the percentage of ownership 
detain by the family. The F-PEC scale was 
calculated using the formula introduced by Klein 
(2000): 
Where EQ is the equity ownership, BoD is the 
board of directors, SB is the supervisory board. The 
first addend measures the family ownership, the 
second addend is the proportion of family members 
in the board of directors over the total member, and 
the third addend is the proportion of family members 
in the supervisory board over the total number. In 
Table 2 we present the mean values and standard 
deviation of %Fam and Fam (F-PEC). 
Family control is significantly higher using the F-
PEC scale than the family ownership. This fact 
suggests that the presence of family members on the 
board of directors is high. It is important to point out 
that the presence of family members in the 
supervisory board is almost inexistent since the 
Portuguese legal law forces the independence of this 
board. 
Analyzing the mean values we can argue that the 
majority of the Portuguese family firms are 
classified according to Jaskiewicz et al. (2005) as a 
weak family owned business. In our definition we 
did not established a minimum threshold for family 
ownership and control, as some researchers did since 
we focus on “family controlled” (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2011). Likewise to our aims we think that the 
family presence, culture and identity in the firm are 
guarantee. 
Then we collected financial information from the 
Thomson DataStream database. The firm risk is the 
firm’s volatility. We first compute the firm’s return 
using its daily stock prices and then we calculate the 
standard deviation of 12 monthly returns. We also 
introduce some control variables to deal with firm’s 
characteristics. The MTBV is the firm market-to-
book value; the firm size (size) is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s assets; the debt is the ratio of 
total debt over assets, the ROA is the firm’s return 
on asset; capex is the ratio of the capital 
expenditures over sales; the sales growth is the 
annual growth of the total sales; DGO is a dummy 
variable which captures the firm’s growth 
opportunities and is equal to one when the firm has 
growth opportunities (market-to-book value higher 
than 1) and zero otherwise . We also control for 
industry using the 2 digit SIC-code.  
 
3.3. Methodology 
To validate our hypotheses we use panel data 
methodology, which is the methodology most 
commonly used in corporate governance studies. We 
also control for unexpected heterogeneity, which is 
usual in governance issues due to firms’ 
specificities, and for biased results (Pindado et al., 
2008). This methodology also solves the potential 
endogeneity problem between ownership structure 
and firm performance and risk.  
The models were estimated using the GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments) approach of 
Mackinlay and Richardson (1991), which is a more 
accurate estimation method to avoid biased results. 
Following Pindado et al. (2008) we use as 
instrumental variables the ones at the right hand side 
of the equations. 
We run the following regression to measure the 
impact of family business on the firm risk: 
 !"#$ = !! + !!×!"#$! + !!×!"#$! + !!×!"#$! + !!×
!"#$! + !!×!"#! + !!×!"#$%! + !!×!.!.! 
We use the regression of firm risk measure 
against the dummy variable, which is one when the 
firm is a family firm and zero otherwise, to validate 
hypothesis 1. We also include some control 
variables. 
This model is similar to that of Jo and Ha (2012). 
They analyze the corporate social responsibility 
impact on the firm risk instead of family impact, but 
the aim of both studies are similar which make it 
relevant to use a similar model. 
To better understand the family firms, which are 
our main aim, we define the following model: 
 !"#$ = !! + !!×%!"#! + !!×!"#$! + !!×!"#$! + !!×
!"#$! + !!×!"#! + !!×!"#$%#! + !!×!"#$%!!"#$%ℎ! 
This second model allows us to understand if the 
family ownership impacts the firm risk. We then 
substitute the %Fam by the Fam (F-PEC) to confirm 
the robustness of our conclusion and to analyze if 
the F-PEC scale, which contains three subscales: 
power, experience and culture, is more accurate to 
analyze the family impact on firm risk. 
We also make an additional estimation to each 
model in which we introduce a dummy variable to 
measure the firm growth opportunities in order to 
see if it has an impact on the firm risk as Díez et al. 
(2008) argue. 
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4. Results and discussion 
The descriptive statistics (panel A) of our sample 
as well as the correlation matrix (panel B) are 
presented in Table 3. The following facts emerge, 
panel A: the firm risk mean is 0.031 and it is very 
volatile suggesting that the firms present different 
risk-taking. On average the market-to-book value is 
higher than one suggesting that there are diverse 
companies with growth opportunities. In our sample 
we have smaller and big firms. The mean value of 
size is 5.583. Finally, debt intensity, ROA, capex 
and sales growth ration are positive but also very 
volatile in the sample. Observing panel B we find 
that none of variables in our sample are highly 
correlated, at least not to a significant extent. 
Before presenting the results from the 
multivariate analysis, we compare the mean values 
of the variables of our sample to family and non-
family firms and analyze if there are significant 
differences between them. Results are present in 
Table 4. 
As we observe in Table 4, family and non-family 
firms present, on average, similar risk, market-to-
book value, size, debt intensity and sales growth. 
Moreover, family firms present higher return (ROA) 
and less capital expenditures than non-family ones. 
This univariate analysis suggests that there is no 
impact of family control on the firm risk. To 
corroborate this result we estimate the first model 
proposed. Results are present in Table 5. 
As we see in table 5, the family presence in the 
firm does not impact its risk, contrary to our 
expectations in hypothesis 1. Miralles-Marcelo et al. 
(2013) found that family firms outperform non-
family ones. Although, even if family firms present 
different return compared to non-family firms, their 
risk is similar. Likewise we do not find the binomial 
relation risk-return.  
When we include the growth opportunities 
variable we find that firms with growth opportunities 
present less risk than the others, which is the 
opposite of our hypothesis 3 and of the results found 
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Risk MTBV Size Debt ROA Capex S.G. 
Mean  0.031  1.709  5.583  0.298  0.013  0.102  0.185 
Median  0.022  1.150  5.536  0.299  0.017  0.035  0.050 
Maximum  0.352  34.340  7.997  17.120  0.679  6.079  24.379 
Minimum  0.000 -96.120  2.431 -0.585 -1.182  0.000 -1.000 
Std. Dev.  0.035  4.702  1.028  0.650  0.099  0.309  1.189 
Skewness  4.137 -10.5890  0.094  23.151 -3.106  12.194  15.870 
Kurtosis  27.101  259.533  2.898  600.328  44.593  206.450  292.246 
Panel B: Correlation coefficients 
 Risk MTBV Size Debt ROA Capex S.G. 
Risk 1       
MTBV -0.090 1      
Size -0.316 0.087 1     
Debt -0.025 -0.012 0.067 1    
ROA -0.170 0.015 0.094 -0.076 1   
Capex -0.032 0.016 0.151 0.011 0.056 1  
S.G. 0.017 0.006 -0.080 -0.034 0.034 0.027 1 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics, namely mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, for the 
variables include in our models: risk is the standard deviation of twelve months return, MTBV is the firm market-to-book 
value, size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s assets, debt is the ratio of total debt over assets, ROA is the firm’s return on 
asset, capex is ratio of the capital expenditures over sales, sales growth (S.G.) is the annual growth of the total sales. Panel B 
reflects the correlation matrix for all these risk factors. 
 
Table 4. Variables difference of a Mean Test 
 Risk MTBV Size Debt ROA Capex S.G. 
Family 0.030 1,607 5.576 0.291 0.021 *** 0.083 ** 0.222 
Non-Family 0.032 1,814 5.591 0.306 0.004 0.122 0.146 
This table presents the mean values of risk (the standard deviation of twelve months return), MTBV (the firm market-to-book 
value), size (the natural logarithm of the firm’s assets), debt (the ratio of total debt over assets), ROA (the firm’s return on 
asset), capex (the ratio of the capital expenditures over sales), sales growth (S.G. - the annual growth of the total sales) of family 
and nonfamily firms. The sample period is 1999-2012. Family firms are firms owned and controlled by a family.  
*, **, *** indicate a difference in means between family and nonfamily firms at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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by Díez et al. (2008). To Portugal, the firms without 
growth opportunities present higher risk may be 
because they invest in innovative projects in order to 
try to subsist in the competitive market, especially in 
a financial crisis period.  
We also find that large-size firms and firms with 
higher return on assets present less risk. It is 
important to point out that firms with higher growth 
opportunities are normally big-size firms with more 
return, less problems of failure and which can gain 
from scales economies and long-term experience. 
Finally we can see that the constant in the model is 
significant to a level of 1%, which suggest that there 
are other variables that can explain the firm risk. 
Family firms, as well as all the groups of firms, 
are not a homogeneous group. To analyze if the 
family control in the family firms firm influences its 
risk we estimate the second model. Results are 
presented in Table 6. 
Neither the percentage of family ownership, 
(models A) neither the family influence measured by 
the F-PEC scale (models B) causes an impact on the 
firm risk. Therefore, our second hypothesis is not 
validated. To Portugal, the firm risk differences are 
not explained by the family control and influence in 
the firm but only by the firm size, return and growth 
opportunities.  
The impact of the control variables in the firm 
risk is the same as explained in the previous model. 
To family firms, the debt intensity is also important 
to explain the firm risk. Higher levels of debt cause 
an increase in the firm risk due to financial distress. 
Table 5. Family impact on firm risk 
 Risk (1) Risk (2) 
C 0.090 *** 0.086 *** 
Dfam -0.001 -0.002 
MTBV -0.001 * -0.000 
Size -0.010 *** -0.008 *** 
Debt -0.001 -0.001 
ROA -0.050 *** -0.044 *** 
Capex 0.002 0.002 
S.G. -0.000 -0.000 
DGO - -0.015 *** 
R2 12.44% 16.03% 
Adj. R2 11.62% 15.12% 
J-Statistic 0.000 0.000 
This table presents the estimates of first model proposed. The firm risk, measured as the firm’s return volatility, is regressed against DFam 
(dummy variable which equals to one when the firm is a family firm and zero otherwise), MTBV (the firm market-to-book value), size (the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s assets), debt (the ratio of total debt over assets), ROA (the firm’s return on asset), capex (the ratio of the capital 
expenditures over sales), and sales growth (S.G.- the annual growth of the total sales). The differences between the first model (risk 1) and the 
second one (risk 2) is that in the second one we introduce a dummy variable which equals to one when the firm as growth opportunities and 
zero otherwise. The last three rows show the statistics R-squared, Adjusted R-squared, and J-statistic. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6. Family control impact on the firm risk 
 Risk (1A) Risk (2A) Risk (1B) Risk (2B) 
C 0.102 *** 0.100 *** 0.107 *** 0.106 ** 
%Fam 0.000 -0.000 - - 
Fam (F-PEC) - - -0.006 -0.007 
MTBV -0.002 *** -0.001 -0.002 *** -0.001 
Size -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.014 *** -0.013 *** 
Debt 0.023 ** 0.026 *** 0.022 ** 0.025 *** 
ROA -0.082 *** -0.068 *** -0.084 *** -0.068 *** 
Capex 0.021 * 0.021 ** 0.021 * 0.021 ** 
S.G. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
DGO - -0.013 *** - -0.013 *** 
R2 19.06% 21.36% 19.28% 21.70% 
Adj. R2 17.55% 19.68% 17.77% 20.02% 
J-Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table presents the estimates of first model proposed. The firm risk, measured as the firm’s return volatility, is regressed against %Fam 
(model A) (Fam-PEC – model B), family ownership (family control calculated using the F-PEC scale), MTBV (the firm market-to-book 
value), size (the natural logarithm of the firm’s assets), debt (the ratio of total debt over assets), ROA (the firm’s return on asset), capex (the 
ratio of the capital expenditures over sales), and sales growth (S.G.- the annual growth of the total sales). The differences between the first 
model (risk 1) and the second one (risk 2) is that in the second one we introduce a dummy variable which equals to one when the firm as 
growth opportunities and zero otherwise. The last three rows show the statistics R-squared, Adjusted R-squared, and J-statistic. 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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As well as we state before, there are other variables 




Family firms are present all over the world. 
These firms not only are concerned with the firm 
value maximization but also with the family 
socioemotional wealth. Therefore, they have unique 
characteristics compared to non-family firms which 
can enhance its return and in turn may have impact 
on the firm risk. 
Our study focuses on the analysis of the risk 
differences between family and non-family firms. 
We also search for the impact of the family control 
on the firm risk, to better understand the family 
firms’ presence in all the economies. Previous 
researchers, as Mazzi (2011) found that there are 
diverse sources of family firm heterogeneities as the 
percentage of family ownership and control. We use 
two ways to measure the family control: the family 
ownership, the most common measure used, and the 
F-PEC scale, an alternative measure introduced by 
Astrachan et al. (2002). This measure solves the 
definition problems of family firms since it includes 
three subscales: power, experience and culture, 
assuring that the family identity in the firm.  
In this context, we analyze all Portuguese 
publicly traded corporations, during the period of 
1999 and 2012. This country is almost unexplored in 
corporate governance issues, but it has the 
predominance of family firms. Around one-half of 
PSI-20 and of all listed firms are family firms, which 
brings relevance to this study. 
Our overall results show that the family influence 
and control has no impact on the firm risk. Only the 
firm size, return and growth opportunities influence 
it. Even though the return of family and non-family 
firms is distinct, their risk is similar. This conclusion 
suggest that or the systematic and unsystematic risk 
of family and non-family firms is different and the 
combination of the two compensate that differences, 
or financial investors may have benefits to invest in 
family firms since they may present higher levels of 
return and the same risk. 
Moreover, contrary to previous results, to 
Portugal if the firm has growth opportunities, the 
firm risk decreases may be because the firm has 
opportunity to do something new and innovative 
which can be the solution to survive in the 
competitive market. These results may be influenced 
by the financial crisis period which has begun in 
2008 and last till now to Portugal. 
Our findings are especially relevant for 
theoretical and practical reasons. First, we contribute 
to extending the literature. We analyze the firm risk, 
a major concern especially in periods of recession. 
Second, our aim is to deeply understand whether the 
firm risk depend on family control. Likewise we use 
some alternative measures of the family control to 
corroborate our results.  
Third, our results are valuable to stakeholders in 
general. Shareholders and directors can understand 
which factors influence the firm risk. Financial 
investors may recognize the benefits and limitations 
of investing in Portuguese family firms. Miralles-
Marcelo et al. (2013) found that the Portuguese 
family firms present an abnormal return than non-
family firms, but these firms do not present different 
risk. Likewise, investing in family firms may 
represent a higher return and the same risk taking. 
Finally, firms’ consultants can support their 
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